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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**

DISCHARGE FOR A
REORGANIZING
CORPORATION-BEWARE OF
THE FORGOTTEN CREDITOR

Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code was designed to give corporate debtors a broader discharge
of debts than is available to individual debtors. Individuals are
subject to the exceptions to discharge set forth in Section 523(a)
of the Code, such as for debts incurred by fraud, liabilities for willful injuries or embezzlement,
alimony and child support obligations, and others.' However,
confirmation of a reorganization
plan discharges the corporate
debtor from all debts that arose
prior to confirmation without regard to Section 523(a). 2
* Counsel to the law firm of Levin &
Weintraub & Crames, New. York City;
member of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
** Professor of Law, Hofstra University
School of Law, Hempstead, New York;
associated with the law firm of Moritt,
Wolfeld & Resnick, Garden City, New
York; associate member of the National
Bankruptcy Conference.
1 See 11 U.S.C. § 114I(d)(2). See 11
U.S.C. § 523(a) for the list of specific exceptions.
2 See U.S.C. § 1141(d)(l). This broad
discharge provision also is applicable to
partnerships in chapter 11.

The less favorable treatment afforded individuals in chapter 11 is
based on the principle that a discharge is intended only for the
honest debtor and that an individual should be held accountable for
his past wrongdoings. However, it
makes sense to discharge such
debts in cases of corporate reorganizations because dishonest management will most likely be replaced, and it will be undesirable
to penalize new management, as
well as shareholders and creditors, for the unscrupulous conduct of former employees. Therefore, even debts incurred by fraud
will be discharged in corporate
cases.
Another manifestation of Congress's intent to give the corporate debtor the broadest possible
discharge is by insulating the reorganizing corporation from the effects of Section 523(a)(3). This is
the section that excepts from an
individual's discharge any debt
"neither listed nor scheduled
under Section 521(1) of this title,
with the name, if known to the
debtor, of the creditor to whom
such debt -is, owed, in time to permit . . . timely filing of a proof of
claim, unless such creditor had
notice or actual knowledge of the

175'

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE LAW JOURNAL

case in time for such timely filing.
••• " 3 Under the Code, even those
debts that are unscheduled are
discharged in a corporate reorganization, whether or not the creditor knew that the case was commenced.
Reliable Electric Co., Inc.

This background leads us to the
recent decision of the court of appeals in Reliable Electric Co.,
Inc. v. Olson Construction Co., 4
where the court indicated that
Congress was a bit overzealous in
attempting to remove as necessary conditions to a discharge
notice to creditors by the best
available means with respect to
the filing of the case and the
confirmation hearing.
Reliable involved a chapter 11
debtor which was an electrical
subcontractor working on a construction project where Olson
Construction Company was the
general contractor. Reliable had
withdrawn from the project in December 1979 because it felt that
Olson had breached the subcontract. On January 30, 1980, Reliable filed its chapter 11 petition.
In its. schedules in bankruptcy
Olson was listed under the schedule "Accounts Receivable" but
never 'as a ''Creditor.''
Some time between January
1980 and November 1980, Reliable's attorney telephoned 01-
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son's attorney and informed him1
of Reliable's filing. However,
Olson did not receive any further
information from Reliable concerning the proceedings. On November 9, 1980, Reliable sued
Olson in state court in Colorado
seeking damages for breach of the
subcontract. In December 1980
Olson removed the action to th;
bankruptcy court5 and asserted a counterclaim for damages
based upon Reliable's prepetition
breach of the subcontract.
On January 6, 1981, Olson filed
its Third Amended Plan of Reorganization. The Disclosure Statement6 annexed to the Plan stated that both the Plan and the
Disclosure Statement had been
sent to all of Reliable's known
creditors. On January 13, the
bankruptcy court mailed notice to
the scheduled creditors informing
them of the time for filing acceptances or rejections to the Plan, of
the co~firmatiol'l hearing, and the
time for filing objections to
confirmation. 7 The confirmation
hearing was conducted on March
9, 1981. An order was thereafter
entered confirming the Plan and
notice of the confirmation and
discharge of Reliable was sent to
the scheduled creditors. Since
Olson was not a scheduled creditor, it did not receive any of the
notices.
s See 28 U.S.C. § 1478.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1125.

6
3

4

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3).
726 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1984).

7
• See Ba~kruptcy Rule 2002 regarding
notice reqmrements.
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In August 1981, almost ten was a denial of due process,
months after the suit was insti- whether the district court erred by
tuted by Reliable against Olson in finding Olson's claim not to be
which Olson filed a counterclaim subject to the Plan and, thus, not
against Reliable, a trial was held dischargeable.
on the subcontract dispute and the
bankruptcy judge dismissed ReliIssue of Adequate Notice
able's complaint and granted
In its discussion, the court of
judgment for Olson on its counappeals considered first the proviterclaim for $10,378. Reliable then
sion of the Bankruptcy Code confiled a claim in the chapter 11 case
tained in Section 1128(a): "After
on behalf of Olson for that sum.s
notice, the court shall hold a hearReliable also filed a motion to
ing on confirmation of a plan." 11
allow the claim as a prepetition
The court noted that this section
debt "subject to compromise and
"requires notice to be given to all
payment as a general unsecured
parties in interest." 12 After Olson
claim under the confirmed Plan of
filed the counterclaim against ReReorganization and, thus, subject
liable on December 23, 1980, Reto discharge. "9
liable
was put on notice of Olson's
However, the bankruptcy court
status as a potential creditor, but
issued an order finding that benonetheless, "no formal notice of
cause Reliable failed to schedule
any kind regarding the reorganizaOlson as a creditor, and failed to
tion proceedings, or the time and
notify Olson of the confirmation
manner of filing a claim, was ever
hearing, "and because Olson's
given
to Olson prior to the
claim would be substantially imconfirmation hearing.'' 13
paired without due process of law
Although not raised below, Reif it were forced to comply with
liable's attorney at oral argument
the Plan, Olson's claim was not
contended that Olson was adesubject to the confirmed Plan and
quately notified because its attortherefore, not discharged." 10 Th~
ney had actual knowledge of the
district court on appeal affirmed
reorganization proceeding. Since
the bankruptcy judge.
this issue touched upon the seriThe court of appeals considered
ous question of due process of
two issues: (1) whether Reliable's
law, the court decided to consider
failure to give Olson reasonable
it even though it had not been
notice of the bankruptcy confirraised in the lower courts.
mation hearing constituted a deThe court cited the Supreme
nial of due process; and (2) ifthere
See Bankruptcy Rule 3004.
Reliable, 726 F.2d at 621.
10 !d. at 621-622.

8

11

9

12

13
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11 U.S.C. § 1128(a).
Reliable, 726 F.2d at 622.
!d.
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Court's language in Mullane v.
Central Hanover Trust Co. 14 :

filed, whether such claim is allowed, or whether the claimholder
has
accepted the plan" 17 ; and
An elementary and fundamental
requirement of due process in any (2) an ''all-encompassing disproceeding which is t'o be accorded charge is necessary to meet the
finality is notice reasonably calcu- purpose of reorganization to give
lated, under all the circumstances, the debtor a 'fresh start.' '' 18 In
to apprise interested parties of the essence, Reliable contended that
pendency of the action and afford Olson's only remedy for not rethem an opportunity to present ceiving adequate notice of the
their objections.
confirmation hearing is that it may
file
a late claim under the conThe court of appeals then relied
firmed
plan.
on New York v. New York, New
15
The
court did not dispute the
Haven & Hartford R.R. Co. in
all-embracing
effect of the disobserving:
charge provisions of the Code
As specifically applied to bank- but required a discharge to be
ruptcy reorganization proceedings,
grounded on notice.
the [Supreme] Court has held that a
creditor, who has general knowledge of a debtor's reorganization
proceeding, has no duty to inquire
about further court action. The
creditor has a "right to assume"
that he will receive all of the
notices required by statute before
his claim is forever barred. 16

Having c-oncluded that Olson
was denied due process, the court
of appeals considered Reliable's
primary contentions: (1) even if
Olson was not given the requisite
notice, Olson was still subject to
the confirmed Plan as were all
creditors since Section 1141(d) of
the Code "discharges all claims,
whether a proof of claim has been
339 u.s. 306, 314 (1950).
344 U.S. 293 (1953). The court also
cited In re Intaco Puerto Rico, Inc., 494
F.2d 94 (lst Cir. 1974), and In re Harbor
Tank Storage Co., Inc., 385 F.2d Ill (3d
Cir. 1967).
16 344 U.S. at 297.
14

15

Sections 1141(c)and 1141(d)ostensibly allow any claim to be discharged even though the claimholder has not received notice of the
proceeding or of the confirmation
hearing. However, we hold that
notwithstanding the language of
Section 1141, the discharge of a
claim without reasonable notice of
the confirmation hearing is violative of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. 1 9

The court rejected Reliable's argument that even if Olson had opposed the Plan, it still would have
had the approval of other creditors necessary for confirmation.
Such "overwhelming approval"
does not justify depriving Olson
"of its guaranteed due pro-
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17

Reliable, 726 F.2d at 622.

/d. at 623.
19Jd.
18
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cess." 20 Moreover, Reliable's reliance on cases 21 under the former
Bankruptcy Act holding that
deficient notice of the confirmation hearing and the date for filing
claims still rendered the creditors'
claims subject to the confirmed
Plan and discharge was not comvincing since they were decided
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in the New York case and
were not controlling.
Addressing the contention that
affirming the finding of the district
court "would defeat the purpose
of Chapter 11-to give the bankrupt debtor a 'fresh start,' " 22 the
court reiterated its previous holding: ''As we noted in the text of
this opinion, Sections 1141(c) and
1141(d) do appear to be 'allencompassing' as applied to creditors' claims. Even so, Olson's
guaranteed right to due process is
paramount under the circumstances presented in this case. " 23
Accordingly, Olson's claim is not
dischargeable in the reorganization case.
Conclusion
The court of appeals in Reliable
applied due process principles and
20

/d. at 623 n.5.
Evans v. Dearborn Mach. Movers
Co., 200 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1953); North
Am. Car Corp. v. Peerless Weighing &
Vending Machs. Corp., 143 F.2d 938 (2d
Cir. 1944); see Reliable, 726 F.2d at 623
n.6.
22 Reliable, 726 F.2d 623 n.6.
23 Id.
21

Section 1128(a) ofthe Bankruptcy
Code to prevent the discharge in
chapter 11 of debts owed to creditors who were not given adequate
notice of the confirmation hearing. Mere knowledge of the commencement of the case is not
sufficient when the giving of formal written notice is possible.
It is important to note that the
court of appeals did not hold that
direct, formal notice is necessary
with respect to creditors who
cannot be identified prior to the
confirmation hearing. In fact, in
New York v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 24
which the court relied, the Supreme Court stated: "Notice by
publication is a poor and sometimes a hopeless substitute for actual service of notice . . . . But
when the names, interests and addresses of persons are unknown,
plain necessity may cause a resort
to publication. " 25 It is only when
a creditor is known by the debtor
but is not scheduled or notified
directly of the confirmation hearing, that reliance on publication is
unacceptable. If no action had
been instituted by Olson and Reliable sued to recover for breach of
warranty after confirmation, is
there any doubt that the counterclaim, if asserted by Olson at
that time, would have been discharged since Reliable knew of no
such claim?

on

344 u.s. 293 (1953).
/d. at 296; see also In re GAC Corp.,
681 F.2d 1295 (11th Cir. 1982).
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